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The following statement expressed by one of Egypt’s 
most prominent talk show hosts reflects the com-
mon narratives on Egyptian media that have domi-
nated public discourse following the military coup 
that led to the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood 
President, Mohammed Morsi. The presenter Ahmed 
Moussa, known to be vocal in his support for the 
military, claims to have received exclusive ‘informa-
tion’ from them, warning his audience: “The free 
army officers decided that anyone suspected of kill-
ing a security member will be killed by them directly 
in the street. There is no need for courts any more”2.
The statement of this talk show host, clearly advo-
cating unlawful killing in the streets, is not a unique 
feature in Egyptian media today. National Egyptian 
media shifted from an excess of attack dog journal-
ism under the rule of the deposed Muslim Brother-
hood President to an excess of lapdog journalism 
post coup. State and private media alike are 
disseminating a uniform message of glorification of 
the military and exclusion of its opponents, present-
ing the latter as the ultimate danger to the State that 
needs not only to be silenced, but also exterminated. 
In this continuous orchestration of simplistic, propa-
gandist media narratives, there is no room for a 
representation of the opposing camp – labelled 
terrorist by the State and the media – nor for any 
plurality of voices. The case of the Egyptian media 
after the military coup is reflective of the difficult pro-
cess of building an independent media system un-
der a political transition, in itself a fragile and volatile 
process.
This article discusses the role played by traditional 
national media in supporting the military coup that 
led to the ouster of the elected government of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The article starts with a brief 
discussion of the role of media in fostering demo- 
cracy under political transitions followed by an over-
view of the main features of the Egyptian media land-
scape before and after the 25 January 2011 
revolution. It investigates the role played by Egyptian 
media, especially prominent talk show hosts, in pro-
viding legitimacy to the military-backed regime, with 
examples from the daily practices of journalists, and 
concludes with an analysis of the Egyptian media 
with respect to its cultural and historical context as 
compared to international transitional experiences. 
Media and Democracy
The analysis of the interplay between media and po-
litical systems under transitions has been the sub-
ject of several debates with a particular focus on the 
impact of media on the fragile process of democrati-
sation. However, the democratisation of the media 
sector itself, often governed by a repressive struc-
tural and legal arsenal under autocratic regimes, 
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remains a major challenge in the context of political 
transitions. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) presented three media 
models in their analysis of the relation between media 
and the political sphere: the polarised pluralist model 
(the Mediterranean countries), the democratic corpo-
ratist model (northern and central Europe) and the li- 
beral model (North Atlantic countries); anticipating an 
international trend towards the third model governed 
by the commercialisation and privatisation of media, as 
opposed to one of state interference. However, this 
analysis is based on a media landscape evolving in 
stable and democratic Western systems. Emerging 
media systems demonstrate different dynamics to sta-
ble ones, although the polarised model presents com-
mon features with media systems emerging in eastern 
and central Europe (Voltmer, 2008:25).
The complexities of the interplay between media and 
politics in new democracies render the application 
of imported models an unrealistic task. Voltmer 
points out the particularities of each media system 
and its correlation with national cultural, political and 
historical elements, as well as the special conditions 
of its implementation when it is imported from an-
other context (ibid). 
The notion of political parallelism – one of the di-
mensions used by Hallin and Mancini to define me-
dia systems – as the solid alliance between political 
groups and the media is relevant to the case of 
Egyptian media post uprising. However, as pointed 
out by Voltmer (2008), political parties are not cen-
tral to political life in countries like Egypt, where 
these parties are weak and lack popular legitimacy. 
The notion of professionalism – another dimension 
used by Hallin and Mancini in defining media sys-
tems – is also problematic as there is no commonly 
accepted definition of professionalism across all 
media systems and countries. 
After the regime change, the coexistence of the old 
and new models “causes considerable confusion and 
conflicts among journalists as to their role in the new 
democratic order” (Voltmer, 2008:27). This confusion 
is very true in the case of Egyptian journalists stuck 
between an old-fashioned journalistic model, which 
has been implemented for decades, and a new – yet 
to be defined – model where established red lines 
have fallen. This confusion ended with the victory of 
entrenched habits, reflected in the outbreak of popu-
list media narratives post military coup in defence of 
what is perceived by these journalists to be their ‘pa-
triotic’ role and identity (el Issawi, 2014).
The reform of the media system, like the reform of 
the political system, can only be based on the struc-
ture and traditions inherited from the old regime. 
Arguing against the notion of good and bad sys-
tems, Voltmer concludes that “emerging democra-
cies develop unique types of media systems that 
differ significantly from those in established demo- 
cracies” (2008:37). This is a thesis demonstrated by 
the case of the Egyptian media where the legacy of 
the past overshadowed reform efforts.
Thus, the role of these emerging media systems in 
promoting or hindering democracy is very much linked 
to the pre-conditions of the political transition and the 
nature of the old system and its institutions. Paths to 
democracy are also not a linear process. Revolution-
ary ideals can be fought by counter revolutions and 
the struggle between the old and new regimes can be 
particularly complex and unpredictable (Ibid). 
The Egyptian Media Landscape before and 
after the Uprising
It is not possible within the remit of this short article 
to present a detailed analysis of the Egyptian media 
industry. I will focus rather on some of its main fea-
tures. Egyptian media is known for a long-standing 
tradition of heavy-handed state intervention. This is 
reflected in the establishment of a redundant appa-
ratus of state-owned media and a coercive regula-
tory environment in which journalists are threatened 
by prison sentences and trials before military courts 
(el Issawi, 2014). 
The re-introduction of private media in the later years 
of the Mubarak regime provided a newsy and mod-
ern media output as well as limited representation of 
dissenting voices. However, the nature of this pri-
vate sector, largely owned by business tycoons 
The case of the Egyptian media after 
the military coup is reflective of the 
difficult process of building an 
independent media system under a 
political transition, in itself a fragile 
and volatile process
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linked to the regime, defies the notion of an ‘inde-
pendent’ media. The ability of the regime to apply 
different pressure tools on these media outlets 
– such as behind-the-scenes control of advertising 
revenues – further limited the ability of these media 
outlets to provide counter narratives (Khamis, 2011). 
The new constitution (January 2014) provides real 
progress in the protection of freedom of information, 
such as guaranteeing freedom of expression and 
opinion, press freedom and media independence 
and banning censorship and prison sentences for 
media offences. However, these improvements are at 
odds with an unprecedented repression campaign, 
implemented by the military-backed government and 
designed to silence dissenting voices. According to 
Reporters Without Borders: “arrests, detention, trials 
on trumped-up charges – the authorities flout the 
constitutional guarantees enshrined in article 71 and 
stop at nothing to silence those who refuse to relay 
the government’s propaganda” (March 2014).
Althougt the new constitution 
(January 2014) provides real 
progress in the protection of 
freedom of information, these 
improvements are at odds with an 
unprecedented repression campaign, 
implemented by the military-backed 
government and designed to silence 
dissenting voices
It is important to note here two main features of the 
Egyptian media landscape related to the topic dis-
cussed in this paper. First, the entrenched self-
censorship habits of Egyptian journalists who 
largely perceive their role as guardians of the re-
gime. This collaborative journalism is at the heart of 
the raison d’etre of the state media, often used as a 
platform for defamation and de-legitimisation of po-
litical or media opponents under the Mubarak re-
gime. This role shifted to the private media in the 
current post-coup phase. Second, the lack of de-
fined and established editorial processes inside 
these newsrooms rendered private media, suppos-
edly independent, unable to counter the interven-
tion of media owners. The independence of state 
media – recently recognised in the new constitu-
tion – is not realistically possible with the heavily 
bureaucratic structure of state media and the 
prominent role of the Ministry of Information in con-
trolling this structure.
Media at the Service of the Coup
Under political transitions, the ability of media to 
play the role of a “market place of ideas” is crucial 
in providing a platform for alternative views, thus 
empowering a vivid civil society, although possibly 
aggravating conflicts and creating confusion (Volt-
mer, 2006:04). The political conflict marking these 
transitions, causes media professionals to strug-
gle between the two opposite ideals of neutral 
journalism, presenting all sides of the controversy, 
and the need for using media for political mobili-
sation (Voltmer, 2006:06).
This notion of a market place of ideas was accom-
modated by Egyptian journalists in the immediate 
aftermath of the uprising. During this time, the margin 
of representation of dissenting voices witnessed an 
unprecedented expansion to the extent that they 
were permitted a platform in state media. This diver-
sity was short-lived as media professionals were less 
inclined to follow the Western ideals of professional 
journalism than to satisfy their political affiliation and 
what they consider to be their national or revolutio- 
nary duty. 
The political parallelism described by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) was reflected in the practice of 
Egyptian journalists under the rule of the deposed 
Brotherhood President, where the media transformed 
into the favoured platform for political lobbying. How-
ever, the parallelism between media and politics was 
a two-way process, where the media played an 
active role in shaping the political sphere, empow-
ered by the lack of popular legitimacy of the new po-
litical actors. 
The conflict between the apparatus of civil servants 
commonly known as the “deep State” and the elect-
ed Islamic government took media as one of its main 
battlefields. The Brotherhood’s alleged attempt to 
control state media – known as the Brotherhoodisa-
tion of media (akhwanat el iilam) – was a major fac-
tor in this struggle. Media independence from state 
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control became a major issue for those who consid-
ered Brotherhood rule to be a replication of the old 
regime’s tactic of muzzling the media for its own 
benefit. Yet, the same angry voices rejoice at the re-
turn of the traditional role of Egyptian journalists: a 
messenger of the regime and its loyal guardian.
Journalists’ self-identification as 
advocates for the ‘national interest,’ 
translated into the defence of the 
regime’s survival, and prevailed over 
the timorous movement among 
journalists after the uprising who 
lobbied for independent and 
professional journalism
In the aftermath of the military coup, the wave of 
populist propaganda swamping national media, 
state and private, is not only a result of the direct in-
tervention of the military apparatus in media content. 
This media U-turn, from fiercely attacking Morsi’s 
presidency to enthusiastically praising the military, 
has its roots primarily in the perception among these 
journalists that their role is that of guardians of ‘the 
State,’ – ‘the regime’ – against its enemies – the re-
gime’s enemies –. Journalists’ self-identification as 
advocates for the ‘national interest,’ translated into 
the defence of the regime’s survival, and prevailed 
over the timorous movement among journalists after 
the uprising who lobbied for independent and pro-
fessional journalism. The widespread intimidation 
and pressure inflicted by the military-backed govern-
ment is not to be underestimated in forcing journal-
ists back to self-censorship. The scope of state re-
pression regarding any kind of criticism of its policies, 
which demonstrates “zero tolerance for any form of 
dissent,” is unprecedented in the country’s history. 
(Human Rights Watch 2014).  
The advocate journalism model is mainly led by the 
prominent talk show hosts, whose role was crucial in 
the popularisation of information delivered from the 
elite to the masses under the Mubarak regime. This 
advocate role was amplified by the struggle between 
liberals and Islamists under Brotherhood rule and 
extended to shaping the political arena. These talk 
show programmes played a major role in fuelling 
popular anger against the Brotherhood’s rule by sys-
tematically disseminating rumours of an alleged dec-
adence of state institutions under Morsi. Some of 
these talk show hosts, known for having been vocal 
against the Brotherhood, were honoured by the mili- 
tary-backed government for their role in supporting 
the so-called June (2013) ‘revolution,’ which led to 
the ouster of the Brotherhood President.  
In his book entitled Les nouveaux chiens de garde 
[the new watchdogs], Serge Halimi (1997) de-
scribes the subtle and complex relationship between 
the political regime and the media elite in France. 
The author records the details of this solid alliance 
between the some thirty leading journalists and the 
political and economic systems, which includes the 
blackout of important information, the systematic in-
vitation of the same guests to comment on events 
and personal relations between prominent media 
figures and politicians. This organic solidarity among 
media ‘stars,’ and between them and the political 
system, makes them the ‘princes’ of their profession, 
allowing them to publish print editorials, present TV 
and radio sequences, in national and regional media 
outlets, as well as publish books, produce films and 
engage in other artistic expressions. “For them, the 
sun never sets,” writes Halimi (1997:76).
While the connection between the Egyptian media 
elite and the regime is accepted by the community of 
national journalists as normal practice, these leading 
media figures are no less influential than their French 
counterparts in stabilising the regime, instead of 
questioning its practices. However, this function 
currently stretches to the extent of creating a para-
noid environment, with warnings of alleged foreign 
conspiracies against Egypt. These media campaigns 
disseminate as ‘information’ some extraordinary 
rumours that stretch logic and reason and yet are dis-
cussed vehemently by media professionals and their 
audiences as solid facts that need no verification. 
The examples abound: the daily al-Wafd – although a 
respectable print publication – published a front 
page headline claiming that the US President Barak 
Obama is a secret Muslim Brotherhood member3. An 
3 See the link to the front page of the Egyptian daily http://blogs.aljazeera.com/topic/egypt/egyptian-media-says-obama-muslim-brotherhood-
member.
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advertisement by a mobile phone operator featuring 
the popular puppet, Abla Fahita, was accused of 
containing subversive messages calling for terrorism. 
The debate on the alleged terrorist actions of the 
puppet swamped talk shows. In the end, the mobile 
phone company had to deny the allegations that the 
advert contains a coded message aimed at destabi-
lising the State in a press release (The Economist, 
Jan 2014). A few months later, an army doctor an-
nounced that the military had developed a cure for 
the virus that causes AIDS, as well as hepatitis C, 
one of Egypt’s main health threats. The announce-
ment framed in a simplistic manner as well as the 
low-key competencies of the so-called ‘doctor’ 
prompted a tough reaction from some prominent 
Egyptian scientists, who called the so-called achieve-
ment a “scandal for Egypt” (Faheem and El-Sheikh, 
Feb 2014). Yet, national media launched fierce cam-
paigns in praise of the so-called ‘doctor,’ attacking 
his critics, including those known for being well- 
respected scientists in the country. 
Conclusion
News or rumours? It is difficult to answer this ques-
tion today in assessing the credibility of information 
disseminated by Egypt’s mainstream media. Most 
importantly, those responsible for editorial decision-
making in these media are not willing to make this 
distinction. A few limited exceptions do provide 
counter narratives, although they are unable to coun-
terbalance the strong wave of propagandist narra-
tives. Egyptian media have returned to their ‘natural’ 
role: that of a mouthpiece tasked with replicating the 
regime’s message with no possible input of their 
own. However, Egyptian journalists are for the most 
part embracing their old role willingly. The alleged 
terror threat is an excuse for all kinds of abuses of 
rights and freedoms. The role of journalists is no 
longer to decry these abuses but to lessen their im-
pact and scope by presenting them to audiences as 
‘necessary measures’ in this particularly fragile phase 
of the country’s history. The alliance between the 
Egyptian media elite and the regime is as organic as 
it is fundamental for the survival of the two parties, 
and goes much further than the simple political par-
allelism described by Hallin and Mancini. The lead-
ing media stars, mainly from the private sector, are 
bound to the regime by a complex system of clien-
telism, making them one of its most efficient compo-
nents. The uprising did not lead to questioning this 
established identity of the journalist as guardian of 
the regime. On the contrary, the complexity of the 
political transition with its extraordinary develop-
ments consolidated this perception. The excessive 
manipulation of national media, to the extent of using 
it as a ‘black box’ to de-legitimate any critical voice, 
including media and revolutionary figures, is proving 
a powerful tool for applying pressure and hampering 
any initiative for media and political reform.
Most importantly, this connivance between nation-
al media and the new military-backed regime is 
imposing a blackout on alarming human rights 
abuses, even when these abuses are committed 
on a large scale. What happened during the 
bloody dispersal of pro-Brotherhood demonstra-
tors by security forces in the so-called Rabea al-
Adaweya sit-in? (14 August 2013) What about 
the daily arbitrary arrests in the streets and torture 
in prisons? What is the story on those ‘honourable 
citizens,’ as described by the media and regime, 
whose good deeds entail arresting and sometimes 
attacking fellow citizens in the street if they sus-
pect they are from the ‘terrorist camp’? What 
about the operations against terrorism in Sinai? 
Who are those alleged terrorists? What about the 
civilian casualties?
The alliance between the Egyptian 
media elite and the regime is as 
organic as it is fundamental for the 
survival of the two parties, and goes 
much further than the simple political 
parallelism
Most of these topics are simply ignored by the me-
dia. This blackout is imposed by means of the re-
News or rumors? It is difficult to 
answer this question today in 
assessing the credibility of 
information disseminated by Egypt’s 
mainstream media
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gime’s monitoring tools, with media editors and 
media professionals themselves convinced these 
topics are not suitable for debate. Neither does the 
intimidation spare foreign media: the arrest of jour-
nalists from the al-Jazeera network on politicised 
charges for the ‘crime’ of doing their job (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014) is a strong message to the 
community of international media to stop reporting 
facts from Egypt, in order to leave media narratives 
as hostages of the regime.
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